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Abstract 
This paper compares the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the US Supreme 
Court to show the weakness of rights-based justifications such as those suggested by Sager and 
Eisgruber, Dworkin and Nussabaum, for the strict religious neutrality of the state. Justifying 
secularism in rights terms is likely to lead to minimialist forms of secularism and risks drawing courts 
into problematic assessments of the compatibility of the beliefs of particular faiths with liberal 
democracy. The paper closes by suggesting that rights-based litigation is a problematic vehicle 
through which to regulate the relationship between religion, the law and the state as fundamental rights 
cannot do justice either to the reasons in favour of strict separation of religion and state or to the 
richness of religious experience.  
Keywords 
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 1 
Introduction 
In this paper I would like to examine some similarities and differences between the approach of pan-
European courts and the United States Supreme Court to the principle of the religious neutrality of the 
state. As a rights-focused court interpreting a charter that lacks a non-establishment clause the 
European Court of Human Rights has developed a jurisprudence on separation of religion and state 
that can help to clarify the degree to which rights are relevant to the justification of the separation of 
religion and state. This comparative perspective should be particularly useful for the United States 
Supreme Court which must interpret a constitutional text (the First Amendment) which deals with both 
the right to religious freedom and non-establishment in the same article. 
I want to use the comparison in the approach of the different courts to make a broader point about 
the role of rights and litigation in the development of norms in this area. I will suggest that the 
prominence of rights and the role played by courts have a distorting effect on debate in this area. 
Rights alone are incapable of doing justice either to religious experience or to the reasons behind the 
separation of religion and state. The centrality of rights-based arguments and litigation therefore 
compromises the development of just and durable arrangements in this important area 
Basis for Protecting the Secular Nature of the State 
European and American courts approach the question of separation between religion and state in a 
context of definite differences but also of great similarities. The two legal systems broadly share the 
wider overall intellectual structure that characterises Western approaches to the role of religion in 
public life that assumes the existence of separate categories of “religious” and political”. However, 
they also approach the judicial regulation of particular conflicts that arise in relation to issues such as 
symbolic endorsement of a faith by a state or the need for laws to be justified by public reason from 
somewhat different starting points. These differences can, I suggest, be most instructive and can allow 
each system to obtain provide valuable clarification of the true principles underlying the separation of 
religion and state. 
In textual terms, there are clear differences between Europe and the United States. The First 
Amendment of the US Constitution covers both freedom of religion and the separation of church and 
state. The European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) has Article 9 guaranteeing freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion but does not have an article requiring separation of church and state, 
something that makes the justification for interventions to support the secular nature of the state more 
complicated. Despite these textual differences, both systems require limits on religious influence over 
law and politics. The USSC has required “valid secular reasons” if legislation is to be held to be valid 
as part of a broader commitment to avoiding the entanglement of religion and the state.
1
 The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR’) has approvingly mentioned the concept of secularism as being in 
harmony with the ECHR however it has focused in decisions such as Refah Partisi v Turkey
2
 (where it 
upheld the dissolution of a political party held to be seeking the establishment of a religiously-based 
legal order) on showing the danger to norms such a privacy, popular sovereignty and equality that the 
establishment of a non-secular legal or political order would bring (in this case an Islamic, sharia-
based order).  
The European approach is concerned with the fact that religious values may be undemocratic and 
oppressive where the US approach is (or at least has been) simply concerned with avoiding 
entanglement of religion and state. There has been lively academic debate over whether the singling 
                                                     
1
 Stone v Graham 449 US 39 (1980). 
2
 [2003] ECHR 87 
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out of religious values alone for exclusion from acting as the basis of public policy is justifiable
3
 but 
the general approach in the US has been to identify religious values per se, irrespective of their content 
as ineligible to act as the basis of law and policy.  
As noted above, the ECHR does not have an article requiring separation of religion and state. 
Therefore, it can only intervene when recourse to religious values in the political system of a signatory 
state can be seen as threatening to the human rights contained in the Convention. This has meant that 
the Court has often been drawn into assessments of whether particular religious beliefs can be seen as 
compatible with values such as gender equality, democracy, privacy, human dignity etc. We see 
therefore in Refah, claims on the part of the Court that Sharia law is incompatible with democracy by 
virtue of its immutable nature and because it may violate human rights such as the prohibition of 
inhuman and degrading treatment (due to the criminal punishments it envisages), privacy rights (due 
to its regulation of the private and intimate sphere) and equality (due to its rules relating to the 
treatment of women).
4
 Similarly, in Dahlab v Switzerland
5
 and Shahin v Turkey
6
 the court made 
reference to the headscarf being a symbol that was hard to reconcile with gender equality. Such 
assessment of the substance of particular religious beliefs is highly dangerous territory for a court to 
enter into and, unsurprisingly, it has brought criticism (most often in relation to stereotyping of Islam 
and Sharia).
7
  
The correctness of the court’s analysis of Islam in these cases and the degree to which such 
statements can be problematic in the light of undoubted societal discrimination against Muslims in 
Europe, are important questions but they are not the focus of this paper. What is significant for our 
purposes is to think why the Court has entered into assessment of the substance of religious beliefs 
which so many courts studiously avoid and which its own Article 9 jurisprudence counsels against (the 
Court has repeatedly said in Article 9 cases that it is impermissible for the state to ‘assess the 
legitimacy of religious beliefs’).8 While the Court is not assessing religious legitimacy or truth in these 
cases it is offering particular interpretations of the beliefs of a faith (as task secular courts are poorly 
equipped to carry out) and assessing whether such interpretations conform to human rights norms. 
The answer lies in the textual difference between the US Constitution and ECHR. The lack of an 
article requiring separation of religion and state deprives the ECtHR of the ability to identify religious 
beliefs as a category of belief that, irrespective of substantive content, cannot form the basis of law. 
Therefore, if it is to intervene in cases where theocracy movements may threaten fundamental rights, 
the Strasbourg Court must justify such intervention in relation to the substantive beliefs of the 
religious movement in question and their compatibility with human rights norms. The US Supreme 
Court, in contrast, does not need to enter into the assessment of the substance of religious beliefs and 
their compatibility with liberal democratic principles or constitutional rights. It can merely identify a 
lack of secular purpose or an attempt to use the state to advance religion and declare a violation on that 
basis alone.  
                                                     
3
 See for example, Juergen Habermas “Intolerance and Discrimination” (2003) 1(1) International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 2, Michael W. McConnell ‘The Problem of Singling Out Religion’ 50 DePaul Law Review 1 (2000), Abner S. 
Greene, ‘The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses’ 102 Yale Law Journal 1611 (1993), John Rawls Political 
Liberalism (1993 New York, Columbia University Press) and Kent Greenawalt Religious Convictions and Political 
Choice (1988 Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press). See also the judgment of Laws LJ in the English and 
Welsh Court of Appeal in MacFarlane v RELATE Avon [2010] EWCA Civ. 771. 
4
 [2003] ECHR 87, paragraph 123. 
5
 Application No.42393/98, judgement of 15 February 2001. 
6
 [2005] ECHR 819. 
7
 See for example Carolyn Evans ‘The Islamic Scarf in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 7 The Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 52. 
8
 Refah Partisi v Turkey [2003] ECHR 87, paragraph 91. 
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The Symbolic Neutrality of the State 
A similar difference in approach has been seen in relation to the issue of the presence of religious 
symbols or messages in state contexts. The USSC has, until recently, had an approach that focused on 
avoiding entanglement between religion and state. In Stone v Graham
9
 the Court found 
unconstitutional a Kentucky statute mandating the display of the Ten Commandments in public 
schools on the ground that it lacked a valid secular purpose. The Court, in addition, made it clear that 
it was irrelevant that the presence of the commandments was not accompanied by obligations to 
participate in prayer or other religious activities, noting that "it is no defence to urge that the religious 
practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment."
10
 In Allegheny 
County v Greater Pittsburgh ACLU Blackmun J noted that the test was "the challenged governmental 
action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an 
endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices."
 11
 In 
these cases the court found that displays of religious symbols could be unconstitutional if they were 
seen as endorsement of a religion by the state without needing to investigate whether such 
endorsement was oppressive of the religious freedom of others. Non-establishment therefore was seen 
as having a justification relating to avoiding entanglement of religion and state that was, by itself, 
sufficient to trigger a finding of unconstitutionality without it being necessary to consider whether the 
non-establishment in question was in some way oppressive of fundamental rights such as religious 
freedom. 
This is in contrast to the approach of the ECtHR. The Strasbourg Court has said repeatedly that the 
state’s role should be confined to acting as the “neutral and organiser of religions”,12 but this statement 
has most often been made in relation to attempted state interference in the internal affairs of religions 
and in Lausti it was clear that it does impose absolute neutrality or precent any symbolic links between 
a faith and a state. In Buscarini v San Marino it found a violation of Article 9 in the compulsory use of 
a traditional oath for legislators in San Marino that required them to say that they swore “on the Holy 
Gospels”.13 However, this finding of a violation was based on the fact that it violated the religious 
freedom of the individual deputies concerned to make them take a religious oath as a condition of 
taking up their seats in Parliament, not on a finding that a religious oath violated a requirement that the 
State be religiously neutral. The Court recognised that a close symbolic relationship between the state 
and a particular faith can be oppressive of religious freedom and violate the Convention but is not 
necessarily so. Oppression of religious freedom (or perhaps another right guaranteed by the 
Convention) was necessary, not simply demonstrating that the State was appearing to endorse a 
particular faith. 
Perhaps the clearest indicator of this approach is the decision of the Grand Chamber of the 
Strasbourg Court in Lautsi v Italy. Here, an atheist mother complained that the right to freedom of 
religion of her children and her right to respect for her philosophical convictions in the education of 
her children were violated by the presence of crucifixes in Italian state schools. Her claim was rejected 
on the grounds that, such presence was a cultural tradition and in the context of the Italian educations 
system as a whole, the crucifix was not sufficiently indoctrinating or oppressive to violate the ECHR 
(thus reversing an earlier ruling by a section of the Court).
14
 The test therefore was oppression, not 
entanglement or visible non-neutrality of the state. For the ECtHR, symbolic links between state and a 
                                                     
9
 Stone v. Graham 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
10
 Stone v. Graham 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
11
 Allegheny County v Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 
12
 See for example Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova [2010] ECHR 518. 
13
 Application 24645/94 Judgement of 18 February 1999. 
14
 [2009] ECHR 1901. 
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faith are problematic only if they become so intensive or indoctrinating that they violate either parental 
autonomy over children or the ability of an individual to hold a different faith. 
It is my view that there should not be crosses in state schools but that the Court was right to rule as 
it did in Lautsi. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) is a human rights court, not a 
constitutional court. Unlike the USSC, it must rule only on whether rights have been violated, not 
what are the appropriate norms for the conduct of political life in a state. What Lautsi shows us is the 
weakness of the connection between rights and the separation of religion and state. Freedom of 
religion and separation of religion and state may be dealt with in the same article of the US 
constitution, but they are conceptually separate. A claim that the state should be religiously neutral 
that rests on rights claims is bound to fail. The impact on an individual of seeing a particular object in 
a particular place such as a school or town hall is, absent other forms of coercion, normally so slight as 
to make a rights claim very weak. State endorsement of religion can be oppressive but is not 
necessarily so. The problem with an assertive religious presence in the public sphere is not really one 
that can adequately be articulated in rights terms.  
A Europeanisation of the First Amendment? 
There is, however, growing confusion in relation to the American approach to the underlying 
justification of non-establishment. Recent cases have moved closer to the ECtHR view that oppression 
is the appropriate test despite the fact that US has unlike ECtHR a non-establishment clause. In The 
Town of Greece v Galloway
15
 Kennedy J, writing for the majority, articulated a test for regulating 
prayer in state contexts that moves closer to the focus on oppression seen in Lautsi and Buscarini and 
away from the idea of avoiding any (even slight) entanglement. In my view this is not the correct 
appraoch but is a logical conclusion of the growth in the academic and judicial focus on non-
establishment as a matter of rights. 
Kennedy’s approach is not entirely new but picks up threads in early judgments such as that of 
O’Connor J in Lynch v Donnelly where she argued that symbolic endorsement is unconstitutional on 
the basis that it may cause a sense of exclusion and inferiority in those of other faiths.
16
 Symbolic 
endorsement, she suggests "sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members 
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community".
17
 This individual and rights-focused approach has been 
strengthened by the academic works of leading American constitutional theorists who favour 
separation of religion and state.  
Ronald Dworkin suggested that equal respect for all citizens precludes the state from endorsing any 
particular faith as this involves a failure to show equal concern for all citizens. Other leading pro-
separation such as Sager and Eisgruber (who characterise establishment of a faith as disparagement of 
those who do not share that faith)
18
 and Nussbaum
19
 have similarly sought to justify prohibitions on 
any symbolic endorsement of a faith by the state on grounds of the potential hurt feelings or sense of 
exclusion that an individual of a minority faith may feel if they see symbolic association of the state 
with a particular faith.  
                                                     
15
 572 US ___(2014) 
16
 It should be pointed out that O’Connor J also offered other reasons more consistent with an approach that seeks non-
entanglement for non-rights reasons. 
17
 465 US at 688. Lynch v. Donnelly, 
18
 Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 2007). 
19
 Martha Nussbaum Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, (Cambridge MA and London, Harvard University 
Press, 2013) at 5-7. 
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Though such an approach appears to mandate maximal symbolic neutrality, it ultimately 
undermines the case for such neutrality the separation of church and state by locating its justification 
in a rights claim that is weak. As Cecile Laborde has pointed out,
20
 hurt feelings or a sense that the 
state does not share one’s values are inevitable parts of democratic life. Those who believe in rigid 
gender roles, racial inequality, dictatorship, parliamentary government or pacifism will all feel 
alienated by the US constitution or the symbols of the US government. Nussbaum’s assertion that “the 
careful neutrality that a liberal state should observe in matters of religious and comprehensive doctrine 
does not extend to the fundamentals of its own conception”21 does not answer the question of why 
such fundamentals may not be religious in nature when religious norms may be liberal and when non-
religious fundamentals may be as deeply felt and may produce equal levels of alienation from those 
who do not share them.  
More importantly for our purposes, none of these theorists shown why there should be a right to 
have the state avoid expressing disagreement with your religious (or other beliefs) or why expression 
on the part of a state of religious belief amounts to a violation of a right to equality. There is no human 
right not to hear particular kinds of arguments in political life nor a right not to see particular symbols 
in state contexts. As the result in Lautsi showed, to rise to the level of actual threats to fundamental 
rights, symbolic links on the part of the state to a particular faith need to be sufficiently intense to 
become oppressive. If the main justification for the religious neutrality of the State is to protect 
individual rights then Kennedy J is correct; no fundamental rights have been violated by a brief 
voluntary prayer, therefore such prayer is constitutional. By making individual rights central to debate 
on the requirement of the religious neutrality of the separationist liberals have moved the legal 
argument onto a terrain which is highly unfavourable to their goals. This is where the European 
example is particularly instructive. If Town of Greece were a European case, say taken by an 
individual against Orthodox prayers before a municipal meeting in the country of Greece, the 
applicant would lose. The Strasbourg Court has made it clear that, as a court whose mission is to 
protect rights and given that it interprets a charter that lacks a non-establishment clause, it must reject 
claims based on non-oppressive symbolic endorsement of a faith by the state. The same is not true of 
the United States where the Constitution has a broader remit than fundamental rights protection and 
where there is an explicit non-establishment clause. Kennedy J is wrong in the US for the reasons that 
he would have been right in Europe. His judgement in Town of Greece and the rights-focused 
arguments of Dworkin, Nussbaum and others, fail to give adequate weight to the non-rights based 
reasons for separating religion and state.
22
 
The Limits of Rights as Justifications for the Secular Nature of the State 
Rights provide very limited support to the fundamental pillars of the secular state: the requirements 
that laws be justified by secular public reasons and that the state not endorse any particular faith. As 
Mark Lilla’s great work The Stillborn God shows,23 the development of the idea of the secular state 
was a reaction to the destructiveness of religious contestation for political power. Rawls’ idea of 
                                                     
20
 Cecile Laborde ‘Equal Liberty, Nonestablishment and Religious Freedom, Legal Theory 2014 1 at 21-22. 
21
 Martha Nussbaum Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, (Cambridge MA and London, Harvard University 
Press, 2013) at 7. 
22
 Such non-rights based justifications have been seen in parts of some previous judgments. See for example See for 
example O’Connor J’s concurring opinion in McCreary County v ACLU 545 US 833 (2005) where she stated: ‘At a time 
when we see around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of religious authority by government, 
Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar 
travails, while allowing private religious exercise to flourish.[…] Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between 
church and state must therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for 
one that has served others so poorly?’ 
23
 Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics and the Modern West (2007, New York, Knopf/Random House). 
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public reason and overlapping consensus, while linked to a theory of justice that sought to protect a 
degree of autonomy for the individual, was focused not on rights but was an attempt to resolve the 
problem of the need for agreement between people of diverse beliefs 
If states use the education system to promote a particular faith, the danger of religious contestation 
for control of state institutions rises and the ability of the state system to serve all declines. The duty to 
refrain from using religiously-specific arguments when arguing for laws that will bind a religiously-
diverse population is not one that can be based on a right not to hear religious arguments. Neither does 
a failure to exclude religious reasons as justifications for laws necessarily involved breaches of 
fundamental rights (given predominant religious teachings on gender and sexuality they may well do 
so but whether religiously justified laws threaten fundamental rights depends on the substantive 
religious beliefs being legislated for; a Quaker theocracy may not threaten most liberal rights to any 
significant degree). Rather, using religious arguments in law-making is problematic because it 
undermines the ethic of citizenship, represents a failure to internalize the legitimacy and permanence 
of religious difference and undermines the idea of the law-making arena as a place where we make an 
effort to transcend religious differences.  
Religious division is, rightly or wrongly seen as permanent and potentially more disruptive of 
political stability in a way that political division is not.
24
 It is also true that, given the teachings of 
predominant forms of religion, those who support liberalism, egalitarianism and the idea of popular 
sovereignty will also support secularism instrumentally, but that fact does not change the reality that 
promotion of stability, not democracy or liberalism, was the original goal of separating religion and 
politics. 
The Limits of Rights in Constitutional Adjudication on Matters of Religion 
I want to conclude by noting particular difficulties that arise from the central role that is now played 
by ideas of rights and by courts adjudicating on such rights in resolving political disputes, problems 
that are particularly acute when we are dealing with issues of freedom of religion and the secular 
nature of the state. 
The existence of legally-enforceable fundamental rights is something that is useful and necessary 
particularly in how it can contribute to correct unfairness that can arise in relation to treatment of 
minorities whose interests may not get full recognition in majoritarian democratic institutions. 
However, legally recognised rights should not become the sole or predominant prism through which 
we approach political disputes. The existence of legally-enforceable rights encourages the use of 
litigation as a tool with which to resolve disputes, something that also has the potential to distort the 
way in which we deal with issues of the structural relationship of the state to religion. 
I have already noted that justifications for the secular state are only poorly translatable into rights 
form. I also believe that the full richness of religious life and religious experience not readily 
translatable into a fundamental right protectable by courts. In Europe we see that the right protected by 
Article 9 ECHR is a right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. While this right does cover 
elements of ritual and collective religious practices the Court of Human Rights has made it clear that 
Article 9 is “primarily a matter of individual belief”.25 The Strasbourg court defends religious freedom 
largely as a choice right. One of the series of rights given to ensure individuals have adequate scope to 
live autonomous lives that may dissent from collective norms. Collective elements of religion will 
only fall under Article 9’s protection in so far as they can be reconciled with this notion of individual 
autonomy. 
                                                     
24
 Whether this is a sustainable conclusion is beyond the scope of this paper.  
25
 See for example Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova [2010] ECHR 518. 
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Critics who state that to view religion as largely a matter of belief and choice does not give 
recognition to the full richness of the religious experience are correct. Yet it cannot be otherwise. The 
law always has to reconfigure complex social reality into a form that is legally operational. That 
always involved a loss of some elements of the rich social reality. A marriage is, under most legal 
systems, a special form of contract, but that hardly does justice to the nature of the relationship 
between spouses. Employment is for some a matter of their identity but it is generally treated by the 
law as contract of exchange of labour for financial reward. The relationship of neighbours goes 
beyond the duty not to make noise or pollute one’s neighbour’s property but the law does not and 
cannot recognize all aspects of such a relationship. 
Moreover, as we all have consciences and the ability to hold beliefs and must all be treated with 
equal concern and respect by the state, the rights guaranteed by Article 9 must be generalisable to us 
all. The Strasbourg Court has repeatedly stressed how Article 9 is “an equally precious asset for non-
believers”26 and courts have recognized beliefs such as pacifism and ecology as being equivalent to 
religion for the purposes of Article 9.
27
 Therefore, the right to religious freedom is likely to cover only 
very narrow and limited elements of religion as it is lived. If religion’s claims to a role in society are 
articulated in terms of rights, that role will be fairly narrow. Given the complex and often conflictual 
relationship between religion and individual autonomy, the claims made by religious bodies risk 
running up against the liberal underpinnings of Article 9 and failing on that basis. In these 
circumstances, the fact that so many religious claims have been articulated in rights terms seems rather 
self-defeating.  
The Distorting Nature of Litigation 
Leaving it to Courts to resolve conflicts over the relationship of religion to the state involves of course, 
the usual cost of the side-lining of democratically accountable bodies but beyond that, the very nature 
of the judicial process itself is distorting. Courts dispense justice in individual cases. When a court is 
tasked with resolving a case in relation to the relationship between religion, law and state it will 
generally be faced with an individual and will be focused on assessing the claim and the curtailment of 
the rights of that individual. This brings various problems. If the other party is a private party, the 
ability to draw on broader constitutional principles that may be remote from the concerns of the parties 
and their dispute may be limited. The state can be brought in as a notice party but the court will still be 
restricted to resolving the particular live dispute between the parties before it. Even where the case is 
one between a private party and the state, the state must bear the burden of asserting all other potential 
rights which may be infringed by the right claimed by the claimant. It may not wish for political or 
other reasons, to assert all of those rights or those theoretical claims may seem remote from the factual 
scenario at hand and be accorded very limited weight. 
Recourse to the courts and particularly to Human Rights Courts such as the ECtHR can encourage 
each side to focus on articulating a position in which they are accorded the status of victim rather than 
attempting to define more general norms for a fair resolution of conflicts that treats everyone fairly. A 
good example of this was the case of Lillian Ladele. She was dismissed from her post as civil registrar 
as she refused on religious grounds to register same-sex unions. Her, ultimately unsuccessful, case 
raised an interesting general question of the clash between free conscience rights and anti-
discrimination norms, yet her lawyers heatedly rejected any attempt to articulate her case in terms of a 
general conscience exemption and insisted that all that was necessary was an exemption for her 
                                                     
26
 Kokkinakis v Greece [1993] ECHR 20. The Court has repeated this statement in almost every Article 9 case since. 
27
 Arrowsmith v UK (1978) 19 DR 5, H. v UK (1993) 16 EHRR DR 44.  
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religious conscience that would operate only in relation to the kind of discrimination (in relation to 
sexual orientation) that she wanted to engage in.
28
 
Finally, the impetus to win a case can lead parties to embrace arguments that they don’t really 
believe or that they may later regret. Many Christian churches argued vehemently in Lausti that 
parents have no human right have their child protected, in the context of the state education system, 
from the general Christian flavour of a society. Will they regret this argument when as looks likely, 
many European societies come to have a generally atheistic flavour and seek to reflect this in their 
public schools? Indeed from secular side we had a similar approach. Is an absolute parental veto on 
exposure to the norms of broader society really what secularists, who often value the right of children 
to dissent from parental choices on religious matters and to exit religious communities, actually want? 
Similarly, the Beckett Center (which litigates on behalf of religious freedom) hailed the Town of 
Greece decision as a victory for religious liberty.
29
 Would they have greeted a decision allowing a 
majority atheist town council to invite Richard Dawkins to celebrate the virtues of reason and 
scepticism in with the same enthusiasm? Does the pressure of litigation not encourage this kind of 
hypocrisy and excessive focus on individuals?  
Trans-Atlantic Lessons 
The jurisprudence of a rights court such as the ECtHR which deals with issues of freedom of religion 
and the secular nature of the state in the absence of a non-establishment clause can provide a useful 
perspective for the USSC on the true goals underpinning the non-establishment part of the First 
Amendment. This lesson is that rights-based justifications for non-establishment are weak and 
ultimately (as in Town of Greece) undermine the principle of non-establishment.  
One of the valuable features of US jurisprudence (no doubt linked to presence of a non-
establishment clause) is the absence of judicial opining on the compatibility of the substance of the 
beliefs of particular religious traditions with liberal democracy. The ECtHR has been right to see that 
religion taking over the state can be oppressive and to state that secularism is a principle which is in 
line with the democratic and liberal values of the ECHR. Post-Lautsi, it is also clear that the Court 
recognises that, given its narrow, rights-focused mandate, mild non-oppressive forms of establishment, 
whether or not they are desirable (or wise in a diversifying religious context) are not for the Court to 
disturb. 
At the same time, the Strasbourg Court must develop tools to allow its rights-focused approach to 
take adequate account of the non-rights based but legitimate reasons which may underpin restrictions 
on religious expression in particular contexts in order to preserve the religious neutrality of the state. 
Moreover, it needs to do so in ways that avoid the kind of pronouncements on the substantive beliefs 
of particular faiths that were seen in Refah, Shahin and Dahlab. Therefore rather than identifying the 
Islamic headscarf as hard to reconcile with gender equality as it did in Dahlab, it could restrict itself to 
noting that a desire to have a school system characterised by religious neutrality is legitimate. There 
are some positive signs in this regard. In SAS v France (which, it should be noted, related to an 
extreme religious symbol in social life rather than the relationship between religion and the state) the 
Court managed to avoid attributing particular meanings to the Islamic face-veil and instead upheld the 
French prohibition on the public wearing of such garments on the basis that the State had the power 
“secure the conditions whereby individuals can live together in their diversity”.30  
                                                     
28
 Eweida and Others v UK [2013] ECHR 37 (Strasbourg decision) Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA 
Civ. 1357. 
29
 See ‘Supreme Court Approves Sectarian Prayer at Public Meetings’ The Washington Post, May 5 2014 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/supreme-court-approves-sectarian-prayer-at-public-
meetings/2014/05/05/62c494da-d487-11e3-8f7d-7786660fff7c_story.html (last accessed 3 December 2014).  
30
 [2014] ECHR 695, paragraph 141. 
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This was criticised by the dissenting judges on the basis that this “does not fall directly under any 
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed within the Convention […] [and as] the concept seems far-
fetched and vague”. Other critics have rightly noted the danger for minority rights of allowing 
fundamental rights to be restricted on grounds other than protecting rights and freedoms. The 
dissenting judges are right that the majority’s reading of this term is strained. However, it is necessary 
to consider whether any other approach is possible. Whether the approach of the French authorities in 
this case was or was not proportionate, our life together is about more than the rights that we hold 
against each other and, as noted above, there are important principles that underpin liberal democratic 
life that are very imperfectly translated into rights terms. There are non-rights factors that rights-
protecting courts must be free to take into account. 
Complexity and the Limits of Lessons and Analogies  
There is much scope for Europe and the US to learn from our respective approaches to the relationship 
between religion and state. However, as academics, we must also be cautious and avoid using 
analogies from other polities or other times in ways that obscure the complexity of multi-faceted 
issues. There are, as noted, significant textual differences between the relevant legal instruments 
between Europe and the US and the USSC as a national court has much greater scope than an 
international tribunal such as the ECtHR to take controversial decisions in areas that are subject to 
such intense dispute. More broadly, the social reality of religion and religious change is vastly 
different in Europe and the US. While religion in public life is controversial in US politics, in Europe, 
religion’s relationship to law, politics and identity is bound up with highly combustible questions 
around immigration, racial discrimination, colonial attitudes, poverty, exclusion and real fear on the 
part of some around the compatibility with liberal democracy of religious traditions that have not been 
subject to the secularising influences that tamed the ambitions of many of the faiths that are long-
established in Europe. Most of the most controversial discussions in Europe take place around the 
issue of Islam and its role in secularised, historically-Christian societies. As the US Muslim population 
is wealthier and a tiny fraction of the proportion of the population of key Western European countries, 
analogies from the United States are of limited use. A larger minority makes very different demands 
from a smaller one and the rest of the population reacts differently when faced with demands from 
larger groups. If the Amish or Muslims made up 5% to 10% of the US population (the proportion of 
the French population that is Muslim) the demands they would make and the willingness of the rest of 
society to agree to such demands would be radically different.  
An over-reliance on analogies may lead us to be blind to the complexities of particular situations, 
to shoe horn current problems into factual matrices from the past and to assume that courts can resolve 
current problems as successfully as they solved previous ones. Many legal academics have been taught 
to venerate rights and the role of courts in defending them. Occasions, such as the US Civil Rights 
movement, where the balance of right and wrong were clear enough to allow courts to successfully 
resolve an issue are historically rare. Most issues are more complex. Those who are discriminated 
against in one way can themselves discriminate in other ways. It is vital that academics do not wish 
away complexity and that they do not assume that the success of courts in bringing justice in one 
context means that they are capable of doing so in all contexts. Separation of religion and politics is 
not just complex and multi-faceted, as Lilla noted, it is not an inevitability but rather a rather curious 
intellectual exercise that comes from particular historical experiences and requires effort. Courts do 
have some role at the margins in policing the boundaries of such a settlement but the ultimate success 
of the project of the secular state depends on a political will to share a single set of political 
institutions amongst a religiously diverse population. Using the courts as the primary vehicle to uphold 
such a system involves a corrosive attempt to subcontract the duty of elected representatives (and 
voters who choose them) to think in principled broader terms and leads to distorted and illogical 
justifications of the separation of religion and state. Finally, focusing on rights forces us to deal with 
rich and complex phenomena such as religion as it is lived and ideas of citizenship and our life 
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together to be dealt with through a phenomenon, the law, which must reconfigure and impoverish 
these concepts in order to make them legally workable. Rights have had a great impact on the 
treatment of many previously oppressed and excluded individuals and the law is a wonderful tool in 
advancing justice. We must however be modest in what we as lawyers, judges and jurists can achieve 
and make sure that we acknowledge that our life together is not just about the rights we hold and that 
we do not crowd out other necessary participants in the formation of just and lasting arrangements on 
these issues. 
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